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Abstract
The Soledad Street/Chinatown Revitalization Project of Salinas, California currently
faces the challenge of defining the future role of homeless services in a revitalized
neighborhood. This research seeks to support that process through the identification of
factors contributing to the failure to find a permanent location for the provision of
homeless services in central Salinas. Focusing primarily on the role of the Downtown
Social Service Board, this research utilizes content analysis of public records to support a
qualitative analysis of records and semi-structured interviews. It is concluded that the
primary factor has been the creation of the Swinging Door Drop-in Center as a resource
for the redevelopment of the Salinas Downtown. Subsequent factors include the creation
of the Downtown Social Service Board as a growth coalition, and a transfer of
responsibility through the creation of the Wheel of Hope.
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Introduction
What that follows is a story of inter-spatial conflict and the use of homeless services to
support downtown redevelopment. The Soledad Street/Chinatown Revitalization Project
is currently grappling with this reality and has begun to ask the question of whether or not
homeless services can compatibly exist in a revitalized community. At the current stage
the answer to this has not been decided, so it is the purpose of this research to document
the establishment of some of Soledad Street’s homeless services and to ask the question:
What factors have contributed to the inability to find a permanent
location for the provision of homeless services in central Salinas?
In 1974 a pilot facility, called the Swinging Door Drop-in Center, was established in
the downtown area of Salinas, California to address problems of homelessness, vagrancy
and public drunkenness. Concurrent with its establishment was the adoption of the
Salinas Central City Planning and Revitalization Program that officially launched the
City’s attempt to bring a “new face” to the downtown along with increased business
activity and economic opportunity. By 1982 the number of arrests for public intoxication
had dropped from 10,000 to 1,600 per year and downtown redevelopment was well on its
way to reality. At that time an organization was created, the Salinas Downtown Social
Service Center Board (later changed to Downtown Social Service Board or DSSB as it
will from now on be referenced), to help secure funding for, and to oversee, the
Downtown’s solution to the homeless problem. Four years later that solution, the
Swinging Door, was established at a new location, across the tracks from downtown, in
Salinas’ historic Chinatown. Over the next twenty years the DSSB contributed to the
economic revitalization of Downtown and played a critical role in the establishment of
Soledad Street as a hub for homeless services in central Salinas.
Historically the Soledad Street/Old Chinatown neighborhood has always been a place
for marginalized peoples. What was once a thriving home for the Chinese, Japanese and
Filipino Pilipino communities has become a center for drug abuse, prostitution and
homelessness. The ACTION Council of Monterey County (2005) estimated the presence
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of some 1,500 homeless individuals in Monterey County, fifty percent of whom reside in
the Salinas area. Within the City of Salinas, the Old Chinatown community and Soledad
Street in particular, have been the hub for homeless services since the 1980’s. Today
Soledad Street is home to a majority of the City of Salinas’s homeless services facilities
including 1) Dorothy’s Place Hospitality Center which sponsors a homeless day shelter, a
women’s night shelter and a soup kitchen, 2) Victory Mission and the Men in Transition,
men’s shelters and job training facilities, as well as the 3) John the XXIII needle
exchange.
With the guidance and vision of California State University Monterey Bay (CSUMB),
a $600,000 grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development is currently
being applied in the facilitation of a community based planning process to bring
revitalization and redevelopment to the Chinatown neighborhood. The grant builds on a
previous ten year relationship between the Service Learning Institute of CSUMB and
Dorothy’s Place, bringing new resources for neighborhood change. The first step in this
process has been the creation of the Salinas Downtown Community Board (SDCB), a
twenty-four member community organization meant to reflect the diverse stakeholders of
the area (Foundation of California State University Monterey Bay, 2005). The vision of
the group, as defined May 23, 2006 is “to create a safe, welcoming, revitalized and
accessible neighborhood that embraces its cultural history, richness and diversity,
offering housing, economic opportunities and community services” in the Soledad
Street/Chinatown area (Salinas Downtown Community Board, May 23, 2006).
But should homeless services remain a part of the revitalized Chinatown? The birth of
the community planning process has coincided with a very important development. In
December of 2006 the Green Gold Inn, home to Dorothy’s Place Hospitality Center,
faced the expiration of the Conditional Use Permit that allows for the legal use of the
building as a day shelter and soup kitchen. Since the founding of the SDCB, questions
regarding the extension of the Green Gold Inn Use Permit and the long-term presence of
homeless services on Soledad Street have been of paramount importance. As the planning
process continues it will be vital for the group to form consensus over the future of these
facilities and their role in a revitalized community. At the current junction the SDCB is
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considering the authorization of a study on the feasibility of relocating homeless services
to another part of town.
In the hope of providing resources for an informed decision, this research applies a
New Urban Political Economy perspective to identify factors contributing to the failure to
find a permanent location for these facilities. In particular, this research focuses on the
role of the Downtown Social Service Board as the facilitating organization in the
establishment and attempted relocation of services on, and from, Soledad Street. With
that stated the following is a basic description of the layout of this report.
First, a review of the scholarly literature illustrates elements of the theoretical
framework being applied in this study. The primary perspective is one of New Urban
Political Economy. Contextually situating this theoretical lens is a discussion of
contemporary perspectives on homelessness and the “Not In My Backyard” syndrome.
The purpose of this review is to build a useful analytical framework through with to
identify factors relevant to the stated research question.
Second, the reader will find a description of the research methodology utilized in this
study. Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with persons
involved in the efforts of the Downtown Social Service Board, and through qualitative
analysis of public records regarding that organization. For the purposes of analyzing
theoretical relationships, a concurrent nested strategy is utilized for the integration of
quantitative, content analysis data into a largely qualitative analysis. The third section
presents the results of this methodology.
The presentation of the results is divided into two sections, a historical analysis and
the statistical outputs from the Content Analysis. The historical analysis of events leading
to the current controversy is presented first. The second section illustrates and discusses
some unique statistical information produced through the content analysis of the public
records.
A section of conclusions discusses the significance of the results in relation to the
research question. This is achieved by weaving together elements of the qualitative and
quantitative analysis to draw conclusions about the relationship between Downtown
redevelopment, the DSSB, and Soledad Street homeless services. In summation, I also
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discuss some contributions, and recommendations of this study, to include areas for
further work.

Literature Review
This discussion illustrates elements of the theoretical framework being applied in this
study. The primary perspective is one of New Urban Political Economy. To situate this
theoretical lens within the current context I have added a discussion regarding
contemporary perspectives on homelessness and the “Not In My Backyard” syndrome.
The purpose of this review is to build a useful analytical framework through with to
identify factors relevant to the stated research question.
New Urban Political Economy
Historically, urban development theory has been dominated by the Chicago School of
thought, focusing on an ecological perspective of urban space relations. In the social
Darwinism of place, the “invisible hand” dictates the geographic distribution of land uses
and human populations to naturally maximize land use values and economic/social
productivity (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Holupka and Shlay, 1993; Logan, 1978;
Molotch, 1990). The inequality and stratification of land uses and urban populations are
perceived as “natural, system-maintaining consequences of differentiation” (Logan,
1978) representing the most efficient division of the labor and population hierarchy:
In the first place, inequality is an inevitable accompaniment of functional
differentiation. Certain functions are by their nature more influential than
others; they are strategically placed in the division of labor and thus
impinge directly upon a larger number of other functions…Secondly,
mutual supplementation through functional differentiation necessitates a
centralization of control. To insure the regular operation of the system
there must be a sufficient governing and coordinating power vested in
some one function (Halway, 1950, pp. 221).
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The perspective of New Urban Political Economy however, is rooted in the Marxist
theories of David Harvey (1973) and Castells (1976). This perspective stresses that
inequality and stratification are not natural, but the result of inter-locational conflicts of
land based elites to affect the growth process in order to create and maintain inequalities
among places to their own advantage. Inter-spatial competition acts to reinforce existing
elements of socio-economic stratification caused by the maintenance of initial economic
advantages through their translation into political power (Logan, 1978).
Molotch (1976) argues that “once people of the metropolis relate themselves to a
certain area, their fortunes and futures become dependent upon the fate of the
geographical unit to which they have become attached” (quoted in Logan, 1978, pp. 408).
In as much as the characteristics attributable to place are defined by local economic and
political relationships with other areas, people are motivated to influence the
development process through political action in order to maintain or improve their
relative position in the socio-economic stratification of place (Logan, 1978; Molotch,
1976; Halupka and Shlay, 1993). The city is, in essence, a growth machine (Molotch,
1976), and its major actors are competing growth coalitions comprised of specific local
and institutional actors with shared networks, competing for influence in local
development outcomes.
The role of politics and agency in shaping place was given its clearest contemporary
expression with the recognition of the city as a “growth machine” by Harvey Molotch in
1976. A growth machine perspective argues that city development outcomes are dictated
by the coordinated actions of growth coalitions who consciously work to manipulate the
urban landscape. An aggregation of specific local actors and institutions with land-use
and growth interests, the coalition is necessarily undemocratic in its need to remain
unaccountable while utilizing symbolic politics to legitimize its authority and propagate
the “goodness of growth” (Halupka and Shlay, 1993).
This lack of democracy and accountability ultimately culminates in the benefits of
development becoming highly skewed. The promises of economic spillover from big
development projects act to disperse responsibility for the costs of economic growth
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among the wide majority of the urban population while concentrating the majority of
tangible benefits in newly redeveloped downtowns.
Redevelopment within this context is a very specific process. The term is narrowly
defined as it relates to California Community Redevelopment Law. Put forth in the
California Health and Safety Code, beginning with section 33000 et seq., this legislation
authorizes local governmental bodies such as the city council or board of supervisors to
establish a redevelopment agency. This agency reports to its establishing body and is
charged with the creation of redevelopment plans that lay out the legal framework to
implement revitalization projects with the goal of revitalizing blighted areas (California
Redevelopment Association, 2006). Revitalization, conversely, is defined as the socioeconomic reinvestment in blighted communities. This term can be, and is often,
associated with redevelopment.
Blighted areas are defined as those which “constitute either physical, social, or
economic liabilities requiring redevelopment in the interest of the health, safety, and
general welfare of the people of the community and the state” (Carlson, W., Elliott, A.
and Seifel, E., 2002). More simply they are those which have suffered from long term
social and economic disinvestment, resulting in vacant lots, degraded facades, little or no
economic activity, increased crime, and social distress.
Because of the complexity of the redevelopment process, such efforts are beyond the
reach of most private sector entities. Consequently, the redevelopment agency has
become a powerful resource in the reshaping of California’s urban landscape through the
intervention of local governments in the urban economic/development process.
Redevelopment resources are naturally quite valuable, both in respect to the possible
financial gain they can induce, and also in their relative scarcity. The agency, along with
local government, therefore, becomes a venue for inter-locational competition as the
distributor of development resources.
The key to understanding the role of homeless services in this type of inter-locational
conflict is to understand the possibility of homeless services becoming valued (or “being
used”) as a resource for continued economic growth, and not necessarily for the benefit
of the homeless population. This connection can be best described as a function of the
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“Not In My Backyard” syndrome – due to individualistic perspectives on homelessness
and a negative externality perceived by the community on the homeless population.
Contemporary Perspective on Homelessness
The primary public and academic perspectives on the causes and nature of
homelessness can generally be categorized into three perspectives focusing on the
individualistic, structural, and political economic causes of homelessness (Shlay and
Rossi, 1992; Wright, 2000; Lee, Jones, and Lewis, 1990; Moore, Sink, and HobanMoore, 1988, Quigley, Raphael, and Smolensky, 2001; Dear and Wolch, 1987). The
individualistic approach stresses personal deficits such as laziness, immorality, alcohol
and drug abuse, physical disabilities, and mental illness as causes for the inability to
acquire and/or the loss of housing (Bahr, 1973; Huber and Form, 1973; for review see
Kluegel and Smith, 1981). Those of the structural perspective focus on issues such as the
lack of affordable housing, livable wage, declining welfare services, and a “variety of
complex social system dislocations” (Wright, Rubin, and Devine, 1998, pp. 4) in their
explanation of homelessness while offering the criticism that the individualistic approach
“blames the victim” (Milburn and Watts, 1986; Hoch, 1986; Swanstrom 1989, Shlay and
Rossi, 1992).
A more contemporary political economic perspective suggests that both individual and
social-structural elements contribute to the transitions of people in and out of
homelessness. Wright (2000) suggests that structuralist elements such as “the decline in
average real wages, the reduction in welfare services, and the inability to secure adequate
housing are part of a national crisis of profitability and productivity that emerged in the
1970s” (pp. 33). These elements are combined with a breakdown in social networks and
the individual’s ability to cope. In so far as wages were driven down, “families had to
work harder and longer to stay ahead, increasing family stress and fraying fragile social
networks” (Wright, 2000, pp. 33). Within this perspective mental illness is seen both as a
cause of homelessness and one of its many symptoms (Shlay and Rossi, 1992; Wright,
2000; Lee, Jones, and Lewis, 1990; Moore, Sink, and Hoban-Moore, 1988, Quigley,
Raphael, and Smolensky, 2001; Dear and Wolch, 1987, Kluegel and Smith, 1981).
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These varying perspectives on homelessness are of particular importance to this
discussion because they impact our common willingness to accept the homeless
community and their accompanying service facilities in our neighborhoods, as will be
discussed in more depth in the following section. Previous research suggests that older,
white, males, of income levels higher than $50,000 per year, possess the highest
statistical likelihood to view the homeless from an individualistic perspective (Gallup
Report, 1985; Huber and Form, 1973; Kluegel and Smith, 1981; Oropesa, 1986; Lee,
Jones, and Lewis, 1990). This same group also has the highest propensity of pursuing
exclusionary tactics toward homeless populations (Tringo, 1970; Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, 1993).
The NIMBY Syndrome
Over the past few decades the professional literature and mass media have shown
increasing coverage of homeless and human service facilities becoming the targets of
exclusionary practices known as the “Not in My Backyard” Syndrome or NIMBYism.
NIMBYism is most frequently defined as a selfish desire of neighborhood residents and
business owners to protect their turf or neighborhood from “toxic” and undesirable
facilities (Dear, 1992; Pendall, 1999; Knox and Thornton, 2002). This type of community
opposition has in many cases led to the abandonment of project proposals, the closing of
recently established facilities, the stigmatization and marginalization of those who society
has labeled “nonproductive”, and the concentration of society’s undesirables into service
dependent ghettos (Piat, 2000; Solomon, 1983; Dear and Takahashi, 1997; Dear and
Wolch, 1987). “At the very least, public opposition results in relationships between the
community and the facility which are strained, with a knock on effect on the well being
and social integration of the clients who use the facility” (Cowan, 2003, pp. 33).
Simply put, NIMBYist opposition is caused by the introduction or proposed
introduction of facilities which carry a perceived threat of negative externality towards
the characteristics which have caused persons to locate in a given neighborhood. These
perceptions are deeply related by proxy to the perceived characteristics of the proposed
facilities and their clients (Dear, 1992; Dear and Gleeson, 1991; Dear and Takahashi,
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1997; Guest and Landale, 1985; Harris, 1999; Knox and Thornton, 2002; Krysan, 2002;
Nguyen, 2005; Oakley, 2002; Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1993; Somerman, 1993;
Spear, 1974), falling into a unique hierarchy of preference (Tringo, 1970; Robert Wood
Johnson Foundaion, 1993). At the highly acceptable end of the spectrum are individuals
and support services for physical disabilities and the problems that most people will face
at some point in their lives (e.g. old age, etc.).

In the middle are various mental

disabilities such as retardation and epilepsy, plus some of the milder social maladies. At
the end of the spectrum that engenders the most community revulsion are the so-called
“social diseases” such as drug abuse, prostitution, homelessness and criminality. This
social stratification is considered to be a reflection of the perceived level of culpability
toward disability groups for their illness (Dear, 1992; Dear and Gleeson, 1991; Dear and
Takahashi, 1997; Guest and Landale, 1985; Tringo, 1970; Robert Wood Johnson
Foundaion, 1993). This realization has drastic impacts relative to the above mentioned
perspectives on the causes of homelessness considering the relative prevalence of mental
illness, criminal records, drug abuse, etc. among homeless populations regardless of
whether these activities are the causes or the symptoms of homelessness, or the result of
some other social trauma.
Community responses to the introduction of human service facilities for all levels of
acceptability are thought to hinge on four main factors related to the way in which
facilities and client populations may impact the characteristics of the community. The
first is client characteristics based on the hierarchy of acceptability stated above. The
second relates to the nature of the human service facility, its location, architectural
design, etc. The third is the structure of the host community. Higher income residential
areas, as would be expected, are thought to be the most exclusive. Lower income and
semi-industrial areas are generally more accepting. Finally, there are also other
programmatic considerations such as client supervision and program staffing that can
impact the ways in which the clients interact with the community (Dear, 1992; Dear and
Taylor, 1982; Glass, 1989; Weber, 1978).
The recognition of these factors is important to this discussion because they
demonstrate the role homeless services can play in mediating the perceived negative
impacts of the homeless community on any given neighborhood. Similarly, the hierarchy
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of preference provides clues to why the homeless are thought incompatible with
revitalized – or redeveloped – communities, and thus, subject to exclusionary tactics.
Integrative Summary (excellent effort!).
The accumulation of literature presented above constitutes the theoretical perspective
utilized in the analytical aspects of this research. Ultimately it is perceived that the three
common perspectives on the nature of homelessness largely impact an individual’s
likelihood to pursue NIMBYist tactics towards homeless populations and their associated
service facilities. NIMBYism results in interspatial conflicts because exclusionary tactics
require the existence of “someone else’s backyard”. It is in this way that new urban
political economy can help us understand the relationship between homeless services and
redevelopment. Although redevelopment is defined specifically by California State law,
the presence of the homeless may become defined as a barrier to economic growth and
redevelopment. The establishment and future relocation of homeless services may,
therefore, become defined as a resource for redevelopment and the economic growth
process (again, not necessarily for the long-term benefits of the homeless population).
Within the particular context of this research, a perspective such as this provides a unique
structure or framework within which the data may be analyzed. This is necessary because
it allows the researcher to approach the data, ready for analysis. Before analysis can take
place, however, the data must be collected and prepared.

Methodology
To provide data on a real world context, to which the above perspective can be
applied, the following Methodology has been pursued. This section states the rationale
used in the choice of procedures for the collection and management of data. First, the
sampling method and procedures are explained for both sets of qualitative samples. Next,
an overview of the concurrent nested strategy for data analysis is given with a description
of the procedures for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Finally, some of the
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practical limitations associated with this methodology are discussed in relation to the
analysis of the data.
Sampling Method and Procedures
There are two primary data sources utilized in this study: 1) Meeting Minutes and
other public records associated with the DSSB and 2) individuals personally involved
with the DSSB. Both data samples were compiled from convenient sources and thus
cannot be considered complete. The public records sample was compiled from those
available at the Salinas Redevelopment Agency and includes meeting minutes,
correspondence, reports, etc., referencing the overall historical progression of the Board
and/or the relocation and establishment of homeless services. A sample of prospective
interviewees representing the various stakeholders involved with the DSSB was
developed from the public records. The sample has been purposefully chosen to make use
of the experience of participants as representative stakeholders to the DSSB and in matters
concerning the establishment of homeless services on Soledad Street. Identified stakeholder
groups include local business, Salinas City government, Monterey County government,
social service providers, property owners/residents, and the street community. The only
criterion for inclusion or exclusion of participants is their participation on, or collaboration
with, the Downtown Social Service Board. Ultimately six participants were scheduled for
interview; two representing Salinas City government, one representing local business, two
representing social service providers, and one representing property owners/residents.
The original intent was to interview one individual from each relevant stakeholder
group. Unfortunately, it was not possible to contact any individuals who had represented
Monterey County government, effectively excluding them from participation. Also, no
members of the street community could be identified as having participated on the DSSB
and thus have been excluded from qualitative interview. A second participant representing
the social service providers was contacted in order to help explain an important event
identified in the public records (in which one of the service providers, Sun Street Centers,
opposed the relocation of homeless services near their facility). Also, a second participant
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from Salinas City Government was interviewed in order to gain from their particular
insight into redevelopment efforts in the Chinatown area.
The Concurrent Nested Strategy for Data Analysis
“The concurrent nested model can be identified by its use of one data
collection phase, during which both quantitative and qualitative data are
collected simultaneously. Unlike the traditional triangulation model, a
nested approach has a predominant method that guides the project. Given
less priority, the method (quantitative or qualitative) is embedded, or
nested, within the predominant method…this model is used so that a
researcher can gain broader perspectives as a result of using the different
methods as opposed to using the predominant method alone” (Creswell,
2003).
This study utilizes two very distinct methods of data analysis. The primary method is the
qualitative coding of interview transcripts and public records. Each document or transcript
is reviewed line by line, identifying historical turning points and analytical themes which
are then documented as memos using relevant quotations. Some of the historical points
documented in this study are the creation of the DSSB, the relocation of the Swinging Door
to Soledad Street, and the closure of the Swinging Door program. Some analytical themes
include for example, rationales for relocation and the dispersion of funding responsibilities.
Interviews lasted between forty five and ninety minutes. They were audio-taped and
transcribed to aid in documentation. This lends greater accuracy in quoting the views of
participants. Participants were apprised of all intended uses of the information they
provided, offered the opportunity to be assigned a pseudonym, and informed of their right
to drop out at any time. If assigned a pseudonym, all description would have been kept at a
general level so that they would not be specifically identified and any responses which
could not be successfully described in general would be excluded from the write-up and
presentation. However, no participants have chosen this, option and may therefore be
identified by name and/or affiliation.
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The secondary method is known as content analysis and is embedded as supplemental
material in the overall qualitative research design. This method allows for statistical
analysis of qualitative data by creating a second, quantitative data set. This is accomplished
by identifying themes, patterns, and trends within the qualitative review that are then
counted, denoting their relative frequency. Theoretical Concepts such as inter-locational
conflict and NIMBYism were used to help identify many of these key trends, relating to
homeless services and downtown redevelopment.
Within the context of this research, content analysis is being used to analyze the
frequency of various rationales for relocating homeless services to and from the Soledad
Street area, in the hope of understanding the DSSB’s primary intentions, as well as other
community dynamics resulting in the current controversy. Rationales for relocation are
defined as reasons for pursuing the relocation of homeless services to, or from, Soledad
Street. The categories used for content analysis are:
1) NIMBYism: defined as a perceived negative externality on the community; to
include an expressed, yet unspecific, incompatibility of the homeless or “street
people” with redevelopment or revitalization.
2) Cost/Benefit Accounting: defined as considerations of financial and quality of life
implications of relocation (e.g. the costs of relocation, the safety of local children,
etc.)
3) Symbolic Politics: defined as an emblematic gesture or declaration, masking or
accompanying an alternative agenda
4) Other: defined as any stated rationale which does not conform to the above
categories.
Of particular note is the difficulty in creating mutually exclusive definitions of the above
categories. NIMBYism and Cost/Benefit Accounting are by nature very interrelated.
NIMBYism pertains to a perceived negative externality which may be manifest in concerns
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of safety impacts or impacts on local business. For the purposes of this study NIMBYism
and Cost/Benefit Accounting have been distinguished by the depth and intensity of their
expression. A reference or rationale has been deemed to be NIMBYistic if it expresses
merely the incompatibility of the homeless population with a given area, without the
statement of the quantifiable impacts.
Using two different types of data allows the researcher to gain unique perspectives
which would not be available from only one data source. The concurrent nested strategy
also facilitates the analysis of data across multiple levels of analysis (Morse, 1991). For
example the historical and the theoretical are used in this study. Other advantages include
the ability to collect both qualitative and quantitative data in a single phase. Although a
multi stage methodology could have benefited this research, the single phase strategy
makes it feasible in light of various time constraints.
Limitations of the Method
There are many obstacles in pursuing this goal. For one, there has been no previous
study of this particular case from which to establish an elementary history. Second, the
documents available in the public archives are incomplete, offering only a partial record.
The record is comprised mostly of meeting minutes that, by their nature, are only a
summery of what was discussed, and lack very much detail. Interviews with involved
persons were used to fill in details unavailable in the public records. The historical nature
of the events being discussed means the recollections of participants may not be totally
reliable. Also, as is understandable with interview research, the information provided by
different participants varies based on their individual perspectives. This presents a
particular challenge to the analysis of interview data as well as an opportunity to draw
unique insight from cases in which interviewees differ and concur with one another.
The main problem found in the implementation of this methodology - outside of the
basic limitations such as time, access to materials, and the incompleteness of the data –
was the necessarily subjective interpretation of historical events and community
dynamics, and resolving discrepancies between the different types of data (contemporary
interview vs. historical records for example). There is little guidance for this found in the
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scholarly literature and it is left up to the researcher to make the critical decisions relative to
the integration of the data into the final analysis. A concurrent nested approach may result
in unequal evidence being presented from each of the data types. This may be natural
however, since the strategy intentionally emphasizes a particular data type (Creswell,
2003).

Results
The following section presents the results of the above outlined research process. A
historical review is presented first, covering the four main phases of DSSB involvement
in the establishment of homeless services on Soledad Street, namely: 1) the creation of
the Swinging Door and the DSSB; 2) relocation of the Swinging Door to Soledad Street;
3) the attempted relocation of services to Sun Street; and, 4) the creation of the Wheel of
Hope. The second section describes the results of the content analysis of public records
and some statistical outputs derived from that procedure.
Historical Analysis
Creation of the Swinging Door and the DSSB (1973-1982)
The History of the Swinging Door program and services in the central city of Salinas
begins in the early 1970’s. Sun Street Centers, an alcohol and drug rehabilitation facility
established in 1968, had received a grant from the California Council on Criminal Justice
to reduce arrests for public intoxication (penal code 647 f). Martin Dodd, former
Executive Director of Sun Street Centers, explains the creation of the Swinging Door:
In 1973, the Center City Authority, eager to revitalize the 100 and 200
blocks [of Main Street], asked Sun Street to propose a plan to remove
residual drunks from the area. I advised them that the men drank,
socialized, and loitered on the street because they had no other place to be.
Hotels would not allow guests in the rooms, they could not be in a
restaurant or bar without purchasing, and if they went to a park, people
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feared them and called the cops. I suggested an “indoor park” where they
could gather, and a farm/housing program outside of town.
I arranged a meeting between street people and the City Council. The
outcome was funding of a drop-in center (the Swinging Door) that opened
on the southwest corner of Pajaro and Market Streets in 1974, funded by
the City (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
The stated purpose of the program throughout its history was to draw the “street
people”, as they were commonly called, off of the streets and away from the store fronts
and alcoves in Downtown (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006; Saunders Interview,
November 6, 2006). This theme of removal is prevalent throughout the history of the
program and seems to derive from NIMBYist perceptions of downtown merchants
regarding the impacts of homeless on the business atmosphere.
But the Swinging Door also provided a number of ancillary services. It was a place
where people could wash their clothes, take a shower, receive phone calls and mail, and
get out of the weather. As long as they weren’t violent, didn’t drink, and weren’t doing
drugs, they could stay there all night (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
The founding of the Swinging Door directly corresponds with the establishment of the
Salinas Central City Planning and Revitalization Program, suggesting an association
between services and urban development. The 1973 Program Study investigates the skid
row phenomenon and recommends short, intermediate and long term approaches “to
mitigate the impacts of the skid row on the Main Street retail area…expand the support
for the existing institutions on Skid Row which are involved in rehabilitation
efforts…[and] reduce the long range costs to the various public agencies which are
involved in Skid Row” (City of Salinas, 1973). Among the recommendations are the
strict regulation of certain business types (such as bars and card rooms), the pursuit of
physical improvements to make the area “undesirable to the undesirables”, the continued
funding of alcoholic rehabilitation programs (namely Sun Street Centers), the assisted
relocation of the Victory Mission, and the creation of a “Downtown Drop-in Center”
(City of Salinas, 1973). The recommendations hinge on the idea that continuation of skid
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row activities would have a negative impact on the development of a redeveloped
business district.
In 1979, a professional evaluation by the County of Monterey concluded that the
Swinging Door program was meeting its intended use:
Nearly three quarters of the businesses in the area and the affected social
service agency staff indicated that the Center was effective in providing a
gathering place off the street. (Multi-Agency Task Force, 1981).
The evaluation provided evidence that the existence of the Swinging Door program
financially benefited the county hospital, and to a somewhat lesser degree, the county
social services and public health nurses. Before the Swinging Door the Department of
Public Health had five public health nurses to track down tuberculosis cases. After the
establishment of the Swinging Door they were cut to one. The program had provided an
ancillary service to the County Department of Public Health by creating a major
gathering place for at risk populations (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
The fact that it [the Swinging Door] provided such a valuable social
service and reduced costs to other agencies prompted Monterey County to
participate in funding the Center’s operation. The total budget in FY 198081 was approximately $85,000, shared 20% County of Monterey, 40%
Salinas Urban Renewal Agency and 40% City of Salinas (Multi-Agency
Task Force, 1981).
In 1980 a Multi-Agency Task Force was created to consider the needs of the “street
people” and the Swinging Door program. Composed of City, County, and business
representatives, it ultimately recommended a combination drop-in center and residential
facility to address the long term issues of homelessness in Downtown. More importantly
from a historical perspective is the recommendation that a Joint Powers Agreement be
created to ensure commitment, financial and otherwise, from Monterey County and the
City of Salinas. The long term objective was “…to make better use of funds which [were]
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already available, not to create a demand for additional funds” (Multi-Agency Task
Force, 1981). The future location of the recommended facilities was also expressed as
vital to their future success, citing a need for further research.
Two years later, in 1982, the recommendations of the Task Force were brought into
practice with the creation of the Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board (The
name was changed to Downtown Social Service Board in 1984). A Joint Powers
Agreement by City Council Resolution, it was composed of five standing members and
three alternates. Two standing members and one alternate were appointed from both the
City of Salinas and the County of Monterey. One standing member and one alternate
were appointed by the Oldtown Salinas Association representing Downtown business
interests (Salinas City Council, 1982).
In 1984 the Board actively pursued the addition of two new board members to allow
for representation by the “greater community at large”. This began the direct participation
of the Salinas Buddhist Temple, the Franciscan Workers, and other organizations, on the
DSSB (Department of Housing and Redevelopment, February 25, 1985). The addition of
new members somewhat mitigated the general lack of democracy present within the
DSSB via the original Joint Powers Agreement. The change however, seems prompted
necessity rather than an ethic of inclusively.
The intended purpose of the Joint Powers Agreement was:
…to establish a Joint Powers Board through which available resource can
be organized and focused to study and evaluate the special needs of people
in downtown Salinas and to plan, design, establish, and operate such
services, programs, or facilities as may be necessary and appropriate to
improve the social environment of the downtown Salinas area (Salinas
City Council, 1982).
When specifically asked about the real nature and purpose of the DSSB, four
of the six interviewees responded that:
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It was basically a group of Downtown interests, wanting to do something
to make sure that the homeless issues stay out of Downtown…The
merchant body and property owner groups, for fairly good reasons, were
concerned about the negative impact of the homeless community and the
affiliate drugs, you know, the folks who use the homeless community as a
shield to sell and buy drugs, was a deterrent to the economic vitality of
Downtown. So they wanted to do everything they could to get that stuff
north of Market (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006).
Recall the association between NIMBYism toward the homeless and the interlocational conflict it can produce. This statement provides a perfect example of
how the DSSB has been a function of this relationship, driven by the NIMBYism
of downtown, but still struggling to make a meaningful impact. This group,
contrary to its title, was composed of downtown redevelopment interests brought
together as a growth coalition, to support the redevelopment process.
Robert Smith, although concurring with the assessment of Mr. Bussard, also
described the DSSB in a more human light:
Just some really, really wonderful people who, uh. Even in their own
minds and hearts were wrestling with several realities all at the same time.
Wanting redevelopment but being challenged by their ideals and ethics
and community morals… (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006).
Relocating to Soledad Street (1984-1987)
Soledad Street prior to the arrival of the Swinging Door was a vibrant place. Card
rooms, bars, hotels, restaurants, were all part of the social and economic vitality of the
old Chinatown. In the 1970’s, during the same wave of public policy adjustment that
created the Swinging Door, the City began to shut down the various bars that made up
most of the area’s commerce. By 1984 much of the economic and social activity had
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subsided. What was left were a few residual businesses/hotels, vacant lots, “prostitution
and drugs” (Saunders Interview, November 6, 2006).
The Swinging Door prior to its relocation had occupied two different locations in the
Downtown. Originally established in the mid-100 block of Pajaro Street, the facility was
moved when a fire broke out in the lower level where the Swinging Door operated (Dodd
Interview, October 31, 2006). The fire forced Sun Street Centers to reestablish the facility
a few doors down, adjacent to the old Plaza Hotel, in the American Meat Market building
on the Corner of Pajaro and Market (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).
The evidence in the public record documenting why the Swinging Door was relocated
from Downtown is thin. The majority of references from the period cite some practical
aspect of the relocation process, such as the identification of relocation sites, the
establishment of a lease, and the appeal of a conditional use permit. One reference,
however, does report that the building (presumably at the corner of Pajaro and Market)
had been sold (Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board, January 17, 1985).
Supporting this explanation, the Swinging Door did in fact receive an official notice to
terminate tenancy on October 31, 1985 (R. C. Taylor, personal communication, July 24,
1985). The reasons for the issuance of this notice are unclear.
The interviews provide a different perspective of the relocation to Soledad Street. Four
of the six interviewees agreed that “the whole point of the relocation from…Market and
Pajaro Street, to Soledad Street was an attempt to concentrate the homeless in one
particular area…so that the Downtown area could have one less hurdle to cross, so they
could renovate” (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006). This reinforces the perceived
association between redevelopment and the inter-locational conflicts fostered by
NIMBYism; as well as the function of the Swinging Door (and its relocation) as a
resource for continued development in Downtown.
When asking why Soledad Street became the focus of the relocation effort, interview
responses seem to suggest the mere convenience of the location. At the time the Salvation
Army occupied the old Republic Hotel (also known as the Lewis Hotel) on Soledad
Street. There were vacant buildings. It was an area already frequented by the homeless
population. The Victory Mission men’s shelter was located there, and the Franciscan
Workers were, at the time, feeding lunch on a vacant lot across the street from the
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Republic Hotel (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006; Saunders Interview, November 6,
2006). Despite the consideration of at least six different properties in the central city area
the relative convenience afforded by the above characteristics meant that 47 Soledad
Street was to become the new location for the Swinging Door (Saunders Interview,
November 6, 2006).
The lease of the Old Republic Hotel was officially established in September 1984,
sharing space with the Salvation Army’s Family Shelter that occupied the upper floor
(Downtown Social Service Board, April 3, 1986). The facility did not open, however,
until March 4, 1986 (Downtown Social Service Board, March 6, 1986). The main reasons
for the delay are serious plumbing and renovation issues with the building itself, and a
denial by the Planning Commission of the Conditional Use Permit (CUP 84-40) that
would have allowed the legal establishment of a homeless service facility at that location.
The denial was seemingly the result of community opposition to the relocation,
represented primarily by the Salinas Buddhist Temple.
The Temple is one of the major Japanese cultural centers in Monterey County and had
for decades “tolerated the City’s turning its back on the [Chinatown] neighborhood”
(Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006). In the past, the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino
communities who occupied the area had been forced to cope with “an alleged effort on
the part of law enforcement to force these kinds of problems from wherever they were
bothering property owners and residents, to go to Chinatown…” (Bussard Interview,
November 14, 2006). In 1984, the Salinas Buddhist Temple was planning a $1,263,000
expansion of their facilities, to include a multi-purpose center and gymnasium
(Takemura, Yamaguchi, and Hirasuna, 1984). When the relocation of the Swinging Door
came before the planning commission the Asian community responded, feeling relocation
was dumping the Downtown’s problem on them (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006), just
as they began to invest. Therefore, NIMBYism from the Chinatown community was
sparked somewhat by the redevelopment in Downtown that was push the homeless across
the tracks. The fear was that the Swinging Door, by attracting homeless from Downtown,
would exacerbate problems of prostitution, public defecation, etc., that were already
present in the neighborhood.
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Considering the effectiveness of services:
…the Buddhist Temple was [also] saying hey wait, it’s already a blighted
area. It’s the blighted area in the City of Salinas. There are drugs and
prostitution, and your going to move it there? How are you going to help
the homeless? That was the thing I always stood on. Hey, you know, do
you take your child, who wants candy all the time, and put them in front of
the candy jar… (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).
On November 15, 1984 the DSSB voted unanimously to file an appeal to the Planning
Commission (Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board, November 15, 1984). The
homeless service use of the Republic Hotel was formally established in July 1985, when
the DSSB appeal was approved. The conditions of the approval prescribe a two-year time
limit and the creation of an advisory committee to look into possible adverse effects of
the Swinging Door on the surrounding neighborhood. Although reasons for the approval
are not stated in the public record the interviews provide some insight. Redevelopment of
Downtown seems to have taken priority for the City Council, over the issues of other
areas (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006). Douglas Iwamoto explained that:
The business association was more powerful than the members of the
Church or Soledad Street (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).
Accompanying this type of power differential and inter-locational conflict between the
Downtown and Chinatown, you can see an element of apathy by the Asian community,
possibly stemming from the years of disenfranchisement by the City.
…it wasn’t so much that the Church didn’t have the backing, it’s that the
property owners around Soledad Street for a century, you can say, never
really gave a dang about the town or its citizens. Otherwise the property
owners would have taken that part of town and fixed it up. But they didn’t
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care. They want the City to do something about it (Iwamoto Interview,
October 31, 2006).
In addition to this we see a pressure on the Temple to live up to the Buddhist ideologies
of compassion:
I think there was quite a bit of dispute within the Board of Directors within
the Buddhist Church as to how they were going to handle it. And I do
remember there was quite a bit of flack for the Church not having
sympathy for the homeless. I think somebody was successful in making
them feel like they were being bad, that they had no sympathy for the
plight of the homeless. And I believe that’s what kind of got them going in
the direction of, well, if we can’t oppose it completely, let’s be involved in
the process and try and make it as good as we can (Saunders Interview,
November 6, 2006).
The key to the relocation, however, seems to be a promise, made by the City, that the
relocation would be temporary. First mentioned when CUP 84-40 was denied, the DSSB
expressed plans in January 1985 for a three year temporary relocation of the Swinging
Door to the Republic Hotel. Interview results show this promise to be largely political
(the actual level at which the DSSB intended to follow through on the promise cannot be
reliably ascertained). Seemingly to help the DSSB “make the leap” (Smith Interview,
November 7, 2006), the promise allowed the Temple to remain visibly compassionate
toward the homeless population. It allowed the Downtown redevelopment area to rid
itself of a troubled population and it offered an opportunity for service providers to
collaborate their provision of services in a conveniently concentrated geographical area.
The promise did, quite expectedly, have consequences. Some of which are still just
coming to be realized by those currently involved. The most obvious is that the City, and
the Salinas Redevelopment Agency in particular, were obliged to pursue relocation of the
Swinging Door to a permanent site “outside the Soledad Street sphere of Influence”.
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At the time this CUP [84-40] was approved, the Downtown Social Service
Board (DSSB), Center City Authority and City Staff were directed to look
for a permanent site for the Swinging Door and an advisory committee
was established to monitor the Swinging Door’s operation on Soledad
Street and to assist in the search for a permanent location. Concurrent with
the Swinging Door’s relocation, direction was given to begin work on a
specific redevelopment plan/strategy for the Soledad Street Phase II Area
(Don Lauritson, August, 19, 1987).
The Phase II Action Strategy outlines redevelopment plans for the Soledad Street area
as the second phase of the Central City Redevelopment Project – of which the Downtown
is the first phase. It discusses two scenarios for the provision of homeless services:
The first alternative is to relocate the homeless services to Sun Street, at a
possible cost of $1.2 to $1.7 million. The second alternative is to retain
these services on Soledad Street, using the monies that would have gone to
relocation to meet the needs of the homeless and to revitalize the
neighborhood (City of Salinas Department of Community Development,
1987).
The DSSB seems to have viewed the second option as the most appealing and
between 1987 and 1991 pursued the acquisition of property at the Corner of Soledad and
Lake Streets for the construction of a permanent facility. It was, however, a local nonprofit organization, Housing for the Homeless, Inc., that became the primary mover and
the DSSB seems to have sat back to pursue other issues, content with having removed the
homeless from Downtown. From a Urban Political Economy perspective it seems that the
primary interest of the DSSB as a growth coalition had been satisfied, that is, the removal
of homeless from Downtown).
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Soledad and Lake Streets (1990-1991)
Housing for the Homeless, Inc. had begun working with the DSSB during the
relocation to Soledad Street and was involved in searching for alternative locations.
Founded by Joe Stave of the Abramson, Church, and Stave law practice, the group had
committed to help provide constructive solutions to the issues of homelessness in central
Salinas. In working with the DSSB they offered their organization as an alternative
funding source for homeless services, and established raising funds to facilitate the
relocation of the Swinging Door as a high priority (Downtown Social Service Board,
March 5, 1987). One of their major contributions was the $150,000 acquisition (paid by
the City) of property at the corner of Soledad Street and Lake Streets (Stave Personal
Communication, September 26, 1990). Evolving just prior to the Sun Street relocation
effort, the plan included architectural designs for a permanent facility and the
consideration of temporary portable housing units. According to Martin Dodd:
…this whole thing was a bureaucratic plan to buy time. The 1989
earthquake resulted in a City push to bring all unreinforced masonry
buildings up to code. The [Republic] Hotel was condemned. A local
architect offered his services to design a new building for the Swinging
Door and Dorothy’s Place…The Temple opposed the move from one
corner of Soledad Street to the other. It was a grand square dance. The
plans were drawn. There was no funding… [the City] had promised the
Temple that no permanent site would be built in Chinatown (Dodd
Interview, October 31, 2006).
Ultimately, the Salinas City Council responded to political pressure for the DSSB to
fulfill their promises and motioned to:
…accept staff recommendations that a new location be explored for the
Swinging Door outside of the Soledad Street area with a return report to
the Council with specific recommendations within 120 days. She added
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that within the 120 days the Redevelopment Department meet with the
Soledad Street area property owners, business owners, and service
providers to review the existing Phase II Redevelopment Plan. She
[Councilmember Meurer] asked that at the end of the 120 days, in addition
to the recommendation of a permanent location for the Swinging Door,
that an additional plan be presented for implementation of the proposals
contained in the Phase II Redevelopment Plan (Salinas Redevelopment
Agency, December 3, 1991).
With City Council pressure such as this, the DSSB could no longer ignore their
promises of relocation and the redevelopment of Chinatown. Their response was to
seriously pursue the acquisition and rehabilitation of two labor camp locations on Sun
Street, just two blocks from the Republic Hotel. Soledad Street, for the time being, was
no longer possible as the location for homeless services in Central Salinas.
Sun Street Relocation Attempt (Peaking in 1991-1992)
The concept of relocating homeless services to a labor camp location has shown a
consistent presence in the records since 1984. Labor camps, for those who are unaware of
the concept, are group-housing complexes designed to house large numbers of seasonal
agricultural workers. The first reference occurs in the public record on January 6, 1984 by
Foster Clark, a long time resident of Salinas (Downtown Salinas Social Service Center
Board, January 26, 2006). By 1987 the DSSB had conducted site reviews and preliminary
relocation cost estimates for three labor camp locations on Sun Street, approximately two
blocks from Chinatown.
Despite in depth plans for relocating to Sun Street, the DSSB seems to be split at times
in their support. On February 5, 1987 for example, the minutes of the DSSB report that
“the DSSB is still strongly opposed to the relocation of the Swinging Door facility and
feel that the Soledad Street location is still the prime site for these facilities”. No reasons
are given for holding this position. Interestingly, one month later we find that a DSSB
subcommittee created to address the relocation of the Swinging door declared that their
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“ideal facility would involve purchase of the majority of property on Sun Street”
(Downtown Social Service Board, March 5, 1987). Notice the inconsistency within the
Board as to their position regarding Sun Street. This suggests the DSSB may not have
been fully committed to the permanent relocation of services. Additionally, as Doug
Iwamoto puts it, “you never had the business association from Main Street jumping on
board to really push it that way” (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006). Thus it seems
the DSSB and the Downtown business interests that they once represented felt content
with services being located in Chinatown. It raises the question whether the Sun Street
relocation was truly in the interest of better service provision, the future redevelopment of
Chinatown, or simply because of political pressure as a consequence of the promises
made years earlier? The answers to these questions have not yet been uncovered.
Sun Street was seen as a location removed from the drugs and prostitution of Soledad
Street that was near enough to the Downtown to meet the service and entertainment needs
of the homeless community (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006; Bussard Interview,
November 14, 2006). The presence of the labor camps meant the area was already home
to a migrant population, with space enough to incorporate and expand services:
We thought it would be a good idea to move all services to one area, and
it would take care of both the men and women, and, if children were
homeless. [It would] try to take care of them all in one place; instead of
having them walk around, because they had no cars. The idea was to have
a one stop shop…Wal-Mart, little campus type” (Iwamoto Interview,
October 31, 2006).
In order to consolidate and expand it was thought necessary to relocate services
together, thus including the Victory Mission and Dorothy’s Soup Kitchen in relocation
plans (Don Lauritson, August 19, 1987). This was in accord with the Central City
Planning and Revitalization Program Study that calls for the “assisted relocation of the
Victory Mission” (Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd, 1973), and the Phase II Action
Strategy discussing the relocation of all Soledad Street homeless services in the event that
redevelopment begin in Chinatown (Department of Community Development, 1987).
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The hope was to have an emergency shelter providing services and beds for extended
stays, with the opportunity to transition into the drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs
at Sun Street Centers, located down the block (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006). The
site worked because, as Larry Bussard puts it:
We had facilities that had both a kitchen, as it were, a feeding area, as it
were, and a sleeping area, as it were. It made some sense to see if you
could take those and convert them into a homeless shelter that has all
those kinds of needs. We took a very long and hard (and fairly expensive)
look. We actually had architects…look at those labor camps…I went out
with the architects with the tape measurer, measured stuff and the whole
drill, figuring out how to go about bringing the facilities up to code…And
we had significant cooperation from property owners. They were willing
to make a sale to us on those properties and we were prepared to do that
(Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006).
Plans developed, and in 1991 produced official site plans (see Appendix A for details)
at an expected cost ranging from $1.2 to $1.7 million (Downtown Social Service Board,
July 21, 2006). Unfortunately, not soon after these plans were drafted a new opposition
began to develop, halting efforts and forcing the City to reconsider. A letter associated
with the 1991 extension of the Swinging Door CUP 91-18 states that:
The Sun Street properties were not considered viable for reasons of
distance and cost…Additionally, there was not a consensus of all
homeless service providers that the Sun Street location was an appropriate
site for these services (McNiff Personal Communication, November 13,
1991).
Interviews indicate that the bulk of the opposition eventually came from Sun Street
Centers and the Victory Mission (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006; Smith
Interview, November 7, 2006; Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006; Dodd Interview,
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October 31, 2006). One perceived problem was an incompatibility between the largely
alcoholic and drug using population which frequents the Swinging Door and Victory
Mission and those in rehabilitation at Sun Street Centers:
The guys that were sober were really getting very judgmental of the guys
who were still drinking on the streets. And, the guys on the streets were
really mad at the guys in the program…the old jargon was the people at
the Mission were taking a dive. There [was] a real animosity between
them (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
Ultimately, Sun Street Centers came to oppose the relocation, viewing the close
proximity of homeless services as not in the best interests of the recovery program. The
Victory Mission on the other hand was nearing the end of their mortgage on the building
at 43 Soledad Street. Larry Bussard reports that:
…somewhere along the line [the Victory Mission] board said, “this
doesn’t make sense. Why do we want to move when we’ve almost got this
building paid for?”…at the end of it, they had a very ceremonial burning
of the mortgage, of the building their in…they had put a fair amount of
money and a lot of blood, sweat and tears into that building (Bussard
Interview, November 14, 2006).
The Mission and Sun Street Centers also shared one belief that pushed them both to
oppose the relocation. In this case NIMBYism takes the form of a legitimate concern
over the safety of local children from the perspectives of homeless service agencies
themselves. Martin Dodd tells that:
…73 school aged children lived on Sun Street. The superintendent of the
Victory Mission stated that the men who lined up on the street at five p.m.
and let out at six a.m. undoubtedly included persons convicted of sex
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offenses…Because the Mission and Sun Street opposed the move, the City
Council rejected the idea (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
Larry Bussard similarly recalls the collapse of Sun Street relocation plans:
…we went through that process, you know, for, seems like the better part
of two years and ran into a political nightmare. Um, and, gave up frankly
and switched courses to pursue the acquisition of the Green Gold Inn and
to work with the Buddhist Temple and Franciscan Workers… (Bussard
Interview, November 14, 2006).
At the end of the Sun Street relocation period, the City and the other various
stakeholders faced the same question that prompted the search in the first place. Do they
continue to pursue relocation, or attempt to resolve issues of conflict between the
homeless community and local property owners, businesses and residents? The consensus
seems to be that relocation had been tried, and so no further attention was paid to
relocating the Swinging Door, and homeless services, from Soledad Street.
Green Gold Inn, Dorothy’s Place, and the Wheel of Hope (1993-Present)
Official discussion over the closure of the Swinging Door began in 1993.

The

overwhelming consensus is that Sun Street Centers plainly got tired of running the
facility and began to loose faith in its usefulness:
Mr. Martin Dodd, Executive Director of Sun Street Centers stated that two
facts must be accepted: A) when the Swinging Door was established it was
expected to be a short-term solution, not a permanent facility; and B)
given all the negative publicity, which it has received over the past eight
years, there is no area in the City which will cooperatively accept the
Swinging Door as a neighbor. It no longer meets the needs of the Buddhist
Temple and business owners in the downtown area; nor does it keep
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“street people” off Main Street; and, it prevents some homeless addicts
and alcoholics from improving their lives (Homeless Service Relocation
Committee, September 14, 1993).
Confronted with an end to Sun Street Centers involvement in the Swinging Door, the
DSSB began looking at other options for providing services in the area. The solution
came in the form of an agreement between the Buddhist Temple and the Franciscan
Workers, who had until this time been serving food in the lower half of the Republic
Hotel. It seems interesting why the Buddhist Temple, after eight years of opposition to
the facility’s presence suddenly became involved in providing services. A September 14,
1993 meeting between the Homeless Service Relocation Committee of the DSSB and the
City Council, provides some insight.
Mr. Uemura explained that the Buddhist Temple has been told for
approximately seven years that the location of the Swinging door is
temporary, and has been repeatedly told that the City was going to
redevelop the area. He explained how Larry Bussard, the Redevelopment
Director has tried to find an alternative site, without the funds to purchase
a new location, and now the money is available, but no one wants the
Swinging door in its neighborhood. Each time that the Swinging door has
requested a permit for operation, the Buddhist Temple has opposed it, but
the permit was issued anyway (Homeless Service Relocation Committee,
September 14, 1993).
Ultimately the Temple congregation concluded that if they could not influence the
establishment or relocation of the Swinging Door, they might as well become involved
with how the services are being provided and ensure the type of structure they believed
might help break the cycle of homelessness (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006). With
the Redevelopment Agency in orchestration, the Buddhist Temple and the Franciscan
Workers formed the “Wheel of Hope”, and merged with Housing for the Homeless to
become a non-profit.
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The terms of the agreement allow the creation of what is today Dorothy’s Place
Hospitality Center and established a ten-year time limit with a possible two-year
extension (laid out in the Conditional Use Permit awarded by the City, facing expiration
December 2006). The facility was to offer the same basic services as the Swinging Door
and Dorothy’s Soup Kitchen, with the addition of case management services, medical
treatment and counseling rooms, overnight shelter needs, and some individual rooms for
rent to the general public (Don Lauritson, March 8, 1994). After twelve-years the Temple
would receive veto power over the use of the Green Gold Inn where the facility is
established (Wheel of Hope, Inc., December 2, 1994). Robert Smith, current director of
Dorothy’s comments:
…we negotiated, We came up with by-laws for the Wheel of Hope and
those by-laws stated that after twelve years the Buddhist Temple would
have…veto power over our continued existence. So, it was, you know, a
compromise on our part. We surrendered our long term freedom and
possible viability to another entity for the sake of continuing in existence
for at least twelve years, we though. And that’s where we’re at right now.
You know, our feet are in the fire (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006).
Ultimately the closure of the Swinging Door and creation of the Wheel of Hope and
Dorothy’s, seem to have had three major impacts on the current controversy over services
on Soledad Street. As Martin Dodd puts it:
I warned all that there were conflicting objectives of the agencies
involved. The Temple wanted people contained, the City wanted to
continue to push people off the 100 block, and the Franciscan Workers
wanted individuals to find and build dignity. What the Redevelopment
Agency achieved was a new Swinging Door without public funding. The
Franciscan Workers got a heartache. The Temple got disappointment
(Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
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The DSSB, which had once been the primary funding and regulatory agency for the
Swinging Door, was now off the hook. They had effectively passed responsibility on to
the Franciscan Worker and Buddhist Temple through the Wheel of Hope.
Once the Wheel of Hope board became active the Downtown Social
Service Board, just kind of fell apart…Because it moved over the tracks
from Main Street. You didn’t have that prevalent problem [in downtown]
(Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).
The result was that Dorothy’s Place and the Franciscan Workers could no longer
benefit from the major City funding which had sustained the Swinging Door. As the
DSSB began to unravel, the regulatory reporting which had allowed the Swinging Door
facility to be monitored, and the benefits of the Swinging Door to be quantified, came
under less supervision and eventually ceased.
After 1995 the records of the DSSB end all together and no conclusive history of its
dismissal can be found, other than that related above. Today, the Wheel of Hope has
reached the end of its twelfth year and the lack of capacity, due to the pullout of
responsibility and funding, has resulted in a Dorothy’s which has not lived up to its
hopes. Today we wait to see the outcome of the current CUP expiration and wonder if it
will bring a new chapter to the story, or a conclusion, to the question of homeless services
in Chinatown.
This concludes the historical analysis of Soledad Street homeless services and the
DSSB as revealed through a qualitative review of the public records and first person
interviews with individuals personally involved. The hope is that the documentation of
this history may help to provide another resource for dialogue, and aid in an informed
decision making process. The section that follows will describe some aspects of the
content analysis of public records. This is being pursued in order to apply integrative
theoretical concepts from UPE, NIMBY, and Redevelopment literatures to a quantitative
perspective, thus add greater insight into the rationales behind these historical events.
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Statistical Analysis
The following results are the product of the Content analysis process where the
researcher has identified themes, patterns, and trends within the qualitative review. The
specific objects of this analysis are references to the relocation of homeless services. These
references have been counted and their relative frequency has been recorded. References
that express a rational for or against relocation were categorized into four categories:
NIMBYism, Cost/Benefit Accounting, Symbolic Politics, and Other. The frequencies of
these references have been used to produce the statistical outputs discussed below. This
analysis has produced unique insights into the association between NIMBYism and
rationales for relocation, the relative agency of various stakeholders in the relocation
discourse, and changes in the amount and content of the discourse over time.
The most significant finding of this analysis is the existence of a statistically significant
relationship between NIMBYism and rationales for relocation. Table 1. illustrates the
distribution of stated rationales for

Figure 1. Distribution of Rationales
For or Against Relocation
Rational Type
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Symbolic Politics
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that support the relocation effort.
Similarly, cost/benefit accounting has

its highest concentration in opposition to the relocation effort.
The association has been confirmed by a chi-square test comparing the frequency of
NIMBYist rationales and rationales supporting relocation. A statistically significant
relationship was found in which Chi-square (X²) equals .002, the degree of freedom equals
1, and where p equals less than the alpha level of .05. Ultimately, this association suggests
that individuals expressing NIMBYist sentiments toward homeless populations are more
likely to support the relocation of homeless serving facilities outside their neighborhood.
Conversely it means that those who support relocation are more likely than not to do so for
reasons of NIMBYism.
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This, of course, is not an absolute association. By looking at the table 1 it is obvious that
cost/benefit accounting is referenced nineteen times as a rational for relocating services and
eleven references to NIMBYism were cited against relocating services. All NIMBYism is
not, therefore, promoting relocation. But, I do believe the significance of the relationship is
clear. NIMBYism has played a large role in the relocation of homeless services, and as will
be discussed later, may have contributed to the identification of homeless services as a
resource for the redevelopment in Downtown.
Prompted by references to exclusivity in the decision making process of growth
coalitions (discussed in the literature review), the analysis has charted the relative agency
of various stakeholder groups in expressing their positions toward relocation. Figure 1.
illustrates the frequency of expression for each stakeholder group, and provides an
interesting realization.

As can be drastically seen, the Salinas City government has

overwhelmingly dominated the discourse around the relocation of services. Contrary to
expectations the local business community and County government have been virtually
silent in the relocation process. This is strange considering their expressed commitment in
Figure 1. Frequency of Expression by Stakeholder Group at DSSB Meetings
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the Joint Powers Agreement and their obvious stake in the relocation effort. The service
providers and property owners represent a somewhat higher percentage of the references
than business or County government. This can be explained by their inclusion in the
relocation process. Since relocation of services had already been written into area
redevelopment plans, it seems that the homeless service providers and neighborhood
stakeholders had more to gain from active participation.
Changes in the relocation discourse have also been charted over time to illustrate
fluctuations in the amount and content of discussions. Figure 2. below illustrates changes in
the amount of discussion over a fourteen year period. Each year is illustrated by the
cumulative involvement of all stakeholders. Notice the major spikes in the discussion in
1985, 1987, 1991, and 1992. The first three correspond with CUP proceedings for the
Swinging Door at the Republic Hotel location on Soledad Street. The fourth spike (1992)
represents the height of the Sun Street relocation effort. These seem to be natural
circumstances for heightened discussion.

Figure 2. Amount of Discussion by Year
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Of more significant impact are the drastic lulls which can be seen to follow the major
peaks in discussion. For example, 1985 witnessed nearly 15 references to the relocation of
the Swinging Door. The same year saw the promise of relocation from Soledad Street and
the appeal of the CUP for establishment of the Swinging Door in the Republic Hotel. In
1986, after being granted a two year CUP, the promised relocation is referenced less than
five times. This suggests that action is avoided unless a catalyst is produced, such as the
expiration of a CUP, the presence of community opposition, or direct instruction by City
Council to relocate services. It seems likely that after 1985 and the relocation to Soledad
Street, the primary function of the Swinging Door had already been accomplished (that is
removing the homeless from Downtown). The lack of action following that relocation,
despite promises to relocated, puts suspicion on the DSSB’s commitment to promises, and
their intentions in relocating the Swinging Door to Soledad Street.
The two figures depicted below represent changes in the content of the relocation
discourse over time. Both figures reflect the fluctuations in the amount of discussion but
provide data on the types of rationales being expressed and their position in supporting or
opposing relocation.
Figure 3. illustrates the use of different rationales in supporting or opposing relocation.
Notice the large peak in the use of cost/benefit accounting in 1987. At closer inspection of
the actual references, this can be attributed to members of the DSSB expressing reasons
why the relocation of services from Soledad Street had not been accomplished and how
Soledad Street is the most appropriate location for services. These include problems of
relocating the current tenants of the Sun Street labor camps, and the $1.2 to $1.7 million
cost of the relocation. The peaks of 1991 and 1992 correspond as well with the serious
consideration and collapse of Sun Street relocation plans.
In Figure 4., it is 1984, 1987, and 1992 that warrant the most attention. Notice in 1984
the large rise in references supporting relocation and the beginning of opposition toward
the Swinging Door. This marks, as you can likely guess, the arrival of the Swinging Door
on Soledad Street. The huge rise in opposition shown in 1987, however, is not representing
the opposition of the Soledad Street community, but that of the DSSB itself. This
corresponds to the rise in cost/benefit accounting mentioned in relation to Figure 3. The
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year 1992, again, references the Sun Street attempt, this time highlighting a large amount of
support for relocation being voiced by the DSSB.
Overall, these results are quite significant. Alone their presentation would be virtually
meaningless. Within the context of the historical review however, this data takes on a
new meaning. The section to follow helps to illuminate that meaning and identifies
factors addressing the original research question. That is:
What factors have contributed to the inability to find a permanent
location for the provision of homeless services in Central Salinas?

Conclusions
The history related above is complicated. Its documentation and analysis have been
equally so. Despite this, the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis has
produced three factors that have contributed to the inability to find a permanent location
for the provision of homeless services in central Salinas. The primary factor that has
influenced all others was the creation of the Swinging Door as a resource for the
redevelopment of the Downtown, which may not necessarily benefit the homeless
population. Subsequent two factors include the creation of the DSSB as a growth
coalition, and the transfer of responsibility through the creation of the Wheel of Hope.
The Swinging Door has been deemed a resource for redevelopment for two reasons.
Its stated purpose from the vary beginning has been the removal of the homeless from the
Streets of Downtown. Whether this meant bringing them inside and out of sight, or
removing them to another part of town, this fact is undeniable. Second the statistical
relationship between NIMBYism and the relocation of the Swinging Door suggests that
relocation efforts were simply an extension of the Swinging Door’s original purpose.
Ultimately, the move from Downtown to Soledad Street had little or nothing to do with
the provision of services and more to do with the perceived negative impacts that the
homeless might have on the redevelopment effort. This simple trend has set the tone for
the entire process, and has impacted the rise of the other two factors.
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At the creation of the Downtown Social Service Board its stated purpose was to
manage funding and to study, plan, and implement services for the homeless. Although
concern was given to the needs of the homeless through countless assessments, and were
considered during the various relocation plans, the makeup and major actions of the
DSSB do not seem to hold the end of homelessness as a high priority.
More so, the accomplishment of the Swinging Door’s main purpose seems to have
driven the group to pursue the relocation of services and the distribution of operational
costs away from the Downtown business association. The relative avoidance and lack of
participation from the County of Monterey, coupled with the City’s deep commitment to
redevelopment, focused the bulk of funding responsibility on the City. The City of
Salinas, the County of Monterey, and the Salinas Oldtown Association all held high
stakes in the redevelopment of Downtown. Thus it was the purpose of the Joint Powers
Agreement to help distribute funding responsibilities amongst the involved organizations.
The role of the Swinging Door as a redevelopment resource puts the makeup and
actions of the DSSB in perspective as a growth coalition. You may recall from the
literature review that a growth coalition is an aggregation of specific local actors and
institutions with land-use and growth interests. Such a coalition is necessarily
undemocratic so that it may remain unaccountable for the negative impacts of the growth
process. The members of the Joint Powers Agreement are in line with this definition and
the inclusion of community members and service providers other than Sun Street Centers
(as the organization running the Swinging Door) seems to have been pursued because
their involvement was necessary for the completion of the Soledad Street relocation.
Remaining completely undemocratic would have doomed the relocation effort and forced
the Swinging Door to remain in the Downtown, consistent with insights from UPE
literature.
Finally, the third factor contributing to an unstable situation for homeless services in
the Soledad Street neighborhood was a shift in responsibility that occurred at the creation
of the Wheel of Hope, Inc. Essentially, the DSSB was able to pass responsibility for
funding and oversight of Dorothy’s Place (the new Swinging Door) onto the Franciscan
Worker and Buddhist Temple. This allowed the City to shrug off a burdensome expense
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and the DSSB to disband with their primary goal achieved (consistent with insights from
NIMBY literature)
Relating to today’s controversy, much of the trouble stems from the three factors above
in creating an atmosphere where services have become part of an overall structure of
inter-spatial competition and the marginalization of a particular area of town. In the drive
for economic growth, the relative influence of the Downtown community allowed them
to manipulate the City’s redevelopment process to solve its social problems, but only at
the expense of a nearby area. This provides a perfect example of how inter-spatial
competition can impact urban development outcomes, and how homeless services can
become a development resource for a NIMBYistic community, not necessarily for their
own benefits.

Contributions
The ultimate lesson of this case is that the containment and relocation of a troubled
population was deemed more efficient and cost effective than attempting to address the
underlying personal and socio-economic causes of homelessness, due to the presence of
“someone else’s backyard”. Exclusionary tactics towards any unwanted population or
facility can only work so long as there is somewhere for it to go. Today, as Soledad Street
begins the process of revitalization, the question has arisen again. What was once
considered “over there” and “across the tracks” has now become valuable as the next step
in the economic growth of central Salinas. It is beyond the scope of this research to
decide whether relocation is the right choice for the future of the area. What can be said is
that in this case a policy of removal had detracted from the ability of services to establish
legitimately and effectively address the issues and causes of homelessness.
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Recommendations
At this point in the revitalization project, based on the results of this research, I would
recommend that the City of Salinas pursue research to investigate the most appropriate
location for the provision of homeless services in the City of Salinas. This should
accompany a thoroughly review of contemporary research on homelessness, its causes
and realistic solutions, and an investigation of compatible locations. The search for
compatible locations should not be limited to those properties that are currently available
but should encompass all properties that would meet the necessary service and
compatibility needs of the homeless and the greater community. Nor should the Soledad
Street or Downtown neighborhoods be excluded from consideration outright.
The purpose of such a study would be to gain perspective on the possibilities for
providing services to competently address the issues, causes, and symptoms of
homelessness in Salinas in a way that can coexist with multiple neighboring uses, such as
residential, light industrial, and retail. Results of such a study could then be used to set
the long term policy goals of the City and County to break the cycle illustrated in this
research. The location, or locations, identified could be written into a long-term plan that
could be implemented over a ten to twenty year period.
For the short term, it is recommended that revitalization efforts be pursued with as
much support as possible from the City, County, local residents, business,
religious/cultural groups, and the homeless community. In support of that revitalization
effort it may be important for services to receive the full support from the community to
provide the highest quality of services possible. By building the capacity of the providers
it is likely that they may be able to more effectively address the issues which most highly
impact the surrounding community. As is illustrated above, the history of services in this
neighborhood is marked by a lack of support for providers in addressing the real issues.
For the revitalization process to continue it will be vital that these services are allowed to
increase their capacity for ameliorating personal and social blight. But they cannot do it
alone.
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Time Lines
Historical Events
Jo int P o wers A greement
Swinging Do o r CUP 84-40
A ppeal
Swinging Do o r Opens o n
So ledad St.

Salinas Central City
P lanning and Revitalizatio n
P ro gram Study

P hase II Redevelo pment
Strategy

Swinging Do o r Established

1970

1975

Creatio n o f the Wheel o f
Ho pe, Inc.

1980

1985

1990

1995
Hight o f Sun Street
Relo catio n A ttempt

So ledad & Lake Street
Relo catio n A ttempt

Conditional Use Permits

Swinging Do o r CUP 84-40

1984

1986

Swinging Do o r CUP 87-24

1988

Swinging Do o r CUP 91-18

1990
Swinging Do o r CUP 89-16

1992

Green Go ld Inn CUP 94-10

1994
Swinging Do o r CUP 93-19A
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